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 Arabella of Charlotte Lennox’s The Female Quixote and Marianne Dashwood of 
Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility are headstrong, independent female characters who 
are unwilling to submit to the husbands that their families have chosen for them.  These 
women pose a threat to the patriarchal order of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries by rejecting their appropriate social roles as physically weak and intellectually 
inferior females in need of male protection and guidance, gender distinctions propagated 
by a culture of sensibility through medical, philosophical, and literary discourse.  
Utilizing reformation narratives common in domestic novels, Lennox and Austen divest 
Arabella and Marianne of their autonomous lifestyles and quickly place them into 
marriages authorized by their families.  However, the restrained tones of these marital 
conclusions, in which Arabella and Marianne are objectified and stripped of their vibrant 
personalities, subvert the convention of reforming insubordinate women and placing 
them under male control.  Therefore, the hurried an disappointing denouements of the 
novels indicate Austen’s and Lennox’s critiques of this gendering of sensibility. 
GRUBBS, ELIZABETH MARIE, M.A. Melville’s Bartleby: A Perfectly-Crafted 
Anomaly. (2013) 
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 Herman Melville’s short story “Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street” 
has puzzled readers for years and provoked hundreds of scholars to explain Bartleby’s 
strange behavior in a multitude of ways using a variety of critical methodologies.  An 
examination of scholars’ compulsion and frustration with classifying this odd character 
along with a close analysis of the narrator’s obsession with understanding Bartleby 
reveals society’s determination to reduce humans into k own identity types.  Thus by 
creating a personification of ambiguity through thec aracter of Bartleby that resists 
simplification, Melville critiques the social drive to classify people using these 
normalized identity roles.  In particular, Melville r veals the limitations and paradoxes 
existing within the appropriate role of the mid-nineteenth-century male through a 
representation of the problematic aspects of capitalism and Jacksonian freedom in 
antebellum America.
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INDEPENDENT WOMEN RENDERED SICK, SUPPLE, AND SUBMISSIVE: 
CHARLOTTE LENNOX AND JANE AUSTEN CRITIQUE 
THE GENDERING OF SENSIBILITY 
  
 
Many novelists of the long eighteenth century employ the reformation narrative, 
in which a wayward character changes into a respectable, happy person, and often the 
comic denouements of these novels include the establishment or restoration of 
matrimonial harmony.  Examples range from Daniel Defoe’s Moll Flanders, in which the 
thief and bigamist Moll becomes a respectable, land-owning wife, to Samuel 
Richardson’s Pamela, that tells the story of how the kidnapper and attempted rapist Mr. B 
transforms into an honorable husband.  Both Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility and 
Charlotte Lennox’s The Female Quixote also tell stories of rebellious characters 
transformed and situated into appropriate marriages.  However, these authors do not grant 
their characters happy marital endings; instead, they employ the reformation narrative in 
order to highlight the problematic and destructive characteristics of the eighteenth-
century model of womanhood.  The novels’ conclusion subdue these autonomous 
women by forcing them to submit to masculine authori y figures through matrimonial 
ties, ultimately rendering their reformations detrimental rather than beneficial. The 
hurried and disappointing marital denouements of both n vels, then, indicate Austen’s 
and Lennox’s critiques of the oppressive representatio  of women in this patriarchal ideal 
of the submissive woman. 
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This eighteenth-century depiction of women as weak and in need of masculine 
protection was in part a product of what G.J. Barker-B nfield calls the “culture of 
sensibility” (xix), in which gender distinctions changed and were solidified in a way that 
both benefited and oppressed women.  Medical literature of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, as well as contemporary conduct books, helped paint this picture of 
woman as morally stronger, but physically, emotionally, nd mentally weaker, a picture 
that became the cornerstone of the culture of sensibility.  Lennox subverts this convention 
through the story of the powerful though quixotic female character Arabella, who is 
praised for her masculine-like reasoning skills.  When Arabella becomes ill, the 
weakening of her body brings about not only the cure of her quixotism but also both the 
annihilation of her autonomy and vibrant, intelligent personality as well as the 
submission to man’s guidance and control.  In this conclusion, Lennox describes the 
upsetting limitations forced on women through the naturalization of feminine weakness.  
Austen takes a different approach to criticizing this depiction of women, for she allows 
Marianne Dashwood to recover from her reforming illness in a way that does not deprive 
her of her autonomy or spirited character.  Through this initial reformation narrative, 
Austen highlights the constructive and beneficial possibilities for a portrayal of women 
and their physical bodies that does not paint them as weak and in need of masculine 
protection.  In the end, however, Austen forces Marianne into a less than pleasing 
marriage that subdues her vibrant personality, mutes her voice, and strips her of control 
over her own life.  By submitting Marianne to this realistic yet disappointing fate, Austen 
reveals her frustration with the pervasive representation of women as the physically, 
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emotionally, and mentally less competent gender.  Through close analysis of Arabella’s 
and Marianne’s transformations, I modify the traditional interpretations of these novels to 
reveal the authors’ criticism of this harmful model of femininity. 
 In The Female Quixote, Lennox roots the unconventional behavior of Arabell  in 
quixotic behavior that derives from reading too many bad translations of French 
romances as a child, while living a secluded life that lacked guidance and worldly 
influence.  When her “wild Imaginations” prevail over a rational approach to 
understanding the world (371), she believes that romances are representative of real life 
and, as the narrator explains, confuses “every Treeat a Distance for a Horse and Knight” 
(95).  Unlike other contemporary authors, who would draw female quixotic characters as 
less capable of reasoning than their male counterparts, Lennox represents Arabella as 
highly intelligent and even able to outwit other men, in spite of her romantic 
misconceptions.  The narrator’s first description of Arabella details her “uncommon 
Quickness of Apprehension, and an Understanding capable of great Improvements” (6).  
Later in the novel, her uncle Sir Charles, in “Admiration of [Arabella’s] Wit,” claims that 
if she had been a man, “she would have made a great Figure in Parliament, and that her 
Speeches might have come perhaps to be printed in time” (311).  Lennox marks 
Arabella’s reasoning skills as masculine and uncommn in women.  However, she paints 
this particular characteristic as appropriate and attractive in Arabella, unlike the gross and 
unappealing masculinity exhibited by Arabella’s friend Miss Groves, who “affected noisy 
Mirth, was a great Romp, and delighted in masculine Ex rcises” (71).  By creating a foil 
in Miss Groves, Lennox draws new gender distinctions that allow more room for women 
4 
 
to exhibit intelligence and mental strength without annihilating all conventional gender 
difference and thus avoiding her readers’ complete r jection of the work. 
Arabella also displays a form of masculinity in thelevel of power she exerts 
through her quixotic adherence to the romantic code, which establishes a position of great 
importance and authority for women, that in the eighteenth century was traditionally only 
given to men.  Sir Charles describes Arabella as “quite her own Mistress” concerning the 
issue of marriage, for her father “had a great opini n of his Daughter’s Prudence” and 
thus did not arrange a marriage, but only stated that his suggested choice for a husband 
was her cousin Mr. Glanville (65).  Arabella, though, adapts a “noble Freedom of Mind” 
and “heroic Disobedience” in her refusal of her father’s suggestion (27).  Even when 
Arabella later chooses to accept Mr. Glanville’s courtship, upon her own convictions and 
not in following the advice of her deceased father, she demands his “Respect and 
Submission to [her] Commands” (18), and in true form to romances, she will not submit 
to his advances until he has at least suffered “TenYears of the most faithful Services, and 
concealed Torments” (111).  She also gives what the narrator calls “dumb Commands” to 
other men in the novel and even attempts to banish one man from England (36-37).  
 Lennox often describes Arabella’s assumption of power as comically absurd and 
in need of adjustment.  For example, she presents Arabella’s presumptuous conversation 
with the sick Mr. Glanville, in which she tells him “I intreat you to live . . . by all the 
Power I have over you, I command you to recover” (134), as ridiculous and indicative of 
her quixotic misunderstandings.  But Lennox does not always paint Arabella’s authority 
and lack of male guardianship as inherently wrong or misguided; in fact, the novel often 
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encourages readers to enjoy and applaud the feminine power Arabella exhibits.  These 
masculine characteristics, however, are considered almost as absurd in the eyes of 
patriarchal society as her quixotic fixations, especially since most occasions in which 
Arabella renders her power she does so to preserve h r virginity.  Margaret Doody 
describes this power as unnatural since “the proper protector of a woman’s chastity in the 
eighteenth century (as traditionally) is assumed not to be herself but a male” (xxxi).  So 
in order for Arabella to assume the socially appropriate role of female, she must be cured 
of her delusions of both quixotism and self-governance and ultimately submit to man’s 
control.   
 In Sense and Sensibility Marianne also wields an unconventional level of 
feminine power before her reformation, though her actions are less comical than 
Arabella’s and more imprudent, petulant, and blameworthy.  Throughout the first half of 
Austen’s novel, Marianne’s troublesome behavior stem  from her unruly display of 
emotions expressed “without any desire of command over herself” (82).  The narrator 
explains that Marianne is “neither reasonable nor candid” due to the “too great 
importance placed by her on the delicacies of a strong sensibility” (190-191).  When she 
is abandoned by her beloved suitor John Willoughby, she becomes depressed, suffering 
from what the narrator calls a “nervous complaint” (214), and this melancholic state 
causes her to act with impropriety.  Helen Small argues that during this nervous 
complaint Marianne is “far from powerless,” for she “indulges, feeds, courts her grief, 
inflicts it on others,” and is “evidently, ‘potent’ and using her power selfishly” (95).  But 
just as Arabella attempts to control her marital outc me, Marianne exerts authority by 
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refusing to accept any advances from her suitor Colonel Brandon, who is financially 
secure and suitable for the family.  Although this amount of feminine power, according to 
Claudia Johnson, appears unnatural because Marianne is “living without the watchful 
supervision of male protectors” (“A ‘Sweet Face’” 168), Austen does not censure 
Marianne’s rejection of Colonel Brandon, like she criticizes her other imprudent actions, 
but instead treats this powerful stance as socially acceptable.   
 A woman’s refusal to marry, however, is problematic w thin the cultural world of 
both Arabella and Marianne, since women of this time had to submit to men through 
marriage in order to assume their proper social place.  George Wright’s essay “On the 
Importance of Marriage,” published in 1793, argues that “the most natural state of human 
society, as well as the primary principle of our nature, is the conjugal connection” (24).  
Robert Shoemaker explains that in the eighteenth century marriage was especially 
important for women: “Because women were generally expected to submit to the 
authority of a man, whether as father, master or husband, single women threatened to 
undermine the social order” (142).  These unmarried women were “distrusted because 
they were not under the authority of a male household ead” (Shoemaker 143).  Arabella 
and Marianne exemplify this.  They lack paternal authority, for both of their fathers die 
before the young women can be betrothed.  Moreover, Arabella and Marianne refuse to 
submit to their suitors and thus reject male guardianship, so they must be transformed in 
order to be subjected to man.  Each character’s reformation narrative highlights the 
characteristic of physical, mental, and emotional weakness inherent in the eighteenth-
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century representation of women needing protection.  By looking at these narratives 
within the context of contemporary cultural and medical discourses, I will argue that  
Lennox and Austen critique this image of the vulnerable woman by manipulating the 
trope of illness as a catalyst for the favorable reform of independent women. 
 Recent scholarship of The Female Quixote has attributed Arabella’s autonomy to 
Lennox’s longing for feminine power, played out through the genre of romance, but 
eventually suppressed in the domestic novel’s realistic ending of a submissive wife.  For 
example, Margaret Doody claims that through reading romances “in which women are of 
great importance” (xxi), Arabella “conceals from herself the sad truth, that she is a pawn 
in the game of property” (xxi) until she is finally “brought back to what the world 
acknowledges as reality” (xxix), and Doody explains that “for a woman, that reality 
means the end of all story, and a cessation of all power” (xxix).  Similarly, Patricia Meyer 
Spacks argues that Lennox’s novel “emphasizes [romances’] profound appeal to women, 
not because of female gullibility but because of the psychic need for alternatives to a 
socially defined state of meaningless and powerless activity” (533).  She concludes that 
“Arabella’s wish to live by the rules of romance criti izes the standards of her society 
especially as they restrict female possibility” (533), though in the end “this would-be 
heroine must learn to accept the ordinary, to welcome the fate of domesticity” (534).  
What they do not assess is the role of illness in the subordination of Arabella to man’s 
control, for it is the physical weakening of Arabella’s body and mind, caused by illness, 
that places her in the appropriate feminine role of needing guidance and protection from 
men.  By creating a heroine who is strong, intellignt, and independent, qualities 
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admirable in a man but not in a woman, Lennox entertains the fantasy of women not 
restricted by these oppressive gender distinctions.  Furthermore, Lennox’s narration of 
Arabella’s transformation, in which Arabella is not only emotionally and mentally but 
also physically submitted to men, criticizes the foundational reasoning behind these 
restricting gender distinctions inherent in female reformation narratives and in domestic 
novels in general. 
 Arabella’s illness comes about when in one of her quixotic delusions walking by 
the Thames, she mistakes oncoming horsemen for kidnappers and attempts an escape by 
imitating the romantic heroine Clelia and throwing herself into the river.  Consequently, 
she suffers from what the narrator calls a “violent Distemper . . . that reduc’d her so low 
that there seem’d very little Probability of her Recovery” (366).  A clergyman is called to 
help her prepare for death, but when she begins to recover, he takes on the task of curing 
her mind.  Lennox fashions this “Pious and Learned Doctor” after one of her literary 
advisors Samuel Johnson, and several scholars have discussed the possibility of Johnson 
actually writing the chapter in which the doctor cues Arabella.1  But Lennox gives her 
doctor the prestige of a clergyman, a minister ordained by the Church of England, unlike 
the devout Dr. Johnson.  Possibly because of Arabella’s pride and stubborn refusal to 
listen to advice, as well as her uncommon intelligence, a clergyman, with his divine 
                                                           
1 John Mitford first made this claim in the Gentleman’s Magazine of August, 1843, citing 
“internal evidence” (132).  Miriam Small, a prominent Lennox biographer, supported Mitford’s 
claim in Charlotte Ramsay Lennox: An Eighteenth-Century Lady of Letters published in 1935 
(79-82).  However, Duncan Isles makes the following insightful suggestion: “It would seem best 
to regard the chapter, with all its faults, as wholly Mrs. Lennox’s until definite evidence to the 
contrary is found” (422). 
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authority, would have more sway over Arabella than a devout scholar.  Nevertheless, the 
clergyman begins this process of reforming Arabella when, as the narrator states, “the 
Health of her Body was almost restored” (368).  Sheis still bedridden during her curing 
conversation with the clergyman, and she remains in a fragile, disabled condition until 
the last two paragraphs of the novel, which quickly summarize her marriage to Mr. 
Glanville.  
 This weakened state proves beneficial to the clergyman’s and the Glanvilles’ goal 
of curing her mind and situating her in the patriarchal system.  She is somber and 
submissive because of her near-death experience, telling the divine doctor that at this 
time, “I would yet rather hear Instructions than Compliments” (370).  Sir George, who 
deceives Arabella in an attempt to seduce her, has a similar reaction when he is wounded 
in a sword fight.  The narrator explains that “the Fear of Death produc’d its usual Effects, 
and made him extremely concern’d for the Errors of his past Life, and very desirous of 
atoning for them if possible” (360).  But physical weakness does not render Sir George 
submissive to guidance as it does Arabella, but instead causes him to simply face his 
misdeeds because of his brush with death.  Arabella, however, needs the aid of a male 
authority figure in order to fix her misunderstandings.  She solicits the clergyman’s 
counsel, stating “I conjure you discover me to myself” (370), and her sickness finally 
strips her of her autonomy and physical strength so that she can become submissive to the 
divine doctor’s teaching.  For the first time in the novel, the weakened Arabella 
relinquishes her power, telling the clergyman, “I exp ct you will exert the Authority of  
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your Function, and I promise you on my Part, Sincerity and Submission” (370).  Illness is 
the agent that finally forces Arabella to submit, physically and mentally, to male control. 
 In Sense and Sensibility, however, Austen utilizes the trope of illness as the 
catalyst for reform in a way that does not comply with the patriarchal goal of 
subordinating woman to man as it does in Lennox’s novel.  Several scholars have debated 
the implications and effects of Marianne’s reformation, especially in relation to Austen’s 
positioning of the text within the discourse of gend r and patriarchy.  However, most 
interpretations fail to recognize the multiple stages of her transformation and only 
acknowledge the overall change from a hypersensitive and at times hysterical single 
female to a more reasonable and reserved woman submitted to a husband.  For example, 
Tony Tanner, whose analysis is often quoted by other scholars, argues that Marianne 
undergoes only one quick transition, and that change is brought about by sickness, “the 
cost of her entry into the sedate stabilities of life,” which acts as a “punitive” catalyst that 
helps transform Marianne from an unruly single woman to one who is “tamed” and 
married (99-100).  Although Barbara Seeber focuses on the “scolding, and finally 
silencing of Marianne Dashwood’s voice” (233), she also ignores the nuances of 
Marianne’s conversion, that reveal a more complex, multi-staged transformation.  
Marianne undergoes two distinct transformations, one instigated by illness that causes her 
to live more reasonably, and another that occurs off tage, subdues her, and silences her 
spirited personality.  A close analysis of these multiple changes exposes Austen’s vision 
of a woman reformed without being restrained by patriarchal gender roles.   
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Marianne’s initial transformation is a reaction to a brush with death.  When 
Marianne is rejected by her lover Willoughby, her sub equent, untempered melancholy 
leads her to neglect her own health, and “sitting in her wet shoes and stockings” after sad, 
lonely walks through the “longest and wettest” grass causes her to become ill with a 
violent cold (286).  As Judy Stove explains, Marianne’s “insistence on nurturing and 
displaying her unhappiness results . . . in her ownillness” (6).  Austen uses the self-
inflicted illness to clearly criticize the power that Marianne wields selfishly and 
imprudently, to indulge in her feelings without regard for her own safety or for others, 
but she does not punish Marianne for the power she commands in order to control her 
own destiny.  The unconventional authority Marianne commands by rejecting Colonel 
Brandon as a husband and remaining a young single woman neither causes her illness nor 
provides a reason for feeling any remorse.  The fevrish affliction caused by Marianne’s 
impetuous behavior, however, does enact its reforming purpose by rendering her weak 
and compliant.  In the midst of a recovery, Marianne claims that her near-death 
experience has given her a pensive outlook, stating, “My Illness has made me think— It 
has given me leisure and calmness for serious recollecti n” (322).  She has learned the 
dangers of yielding to an excessive sensibility andmakes the following promise: “My 
feelings shall be governed and my temper improved” (323).   
 An important aspect of Marianne’s recovery lies in the fact that she recognizes 
her own mistakes, and what counseling she does require, she receives from other females.  
Marianne’s more sensible sister Elinor immediately perceives Marianne’s changes at the 
beginning of her physical recovery from illness, observing “the direction of a mind 
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awakened to reasonable exertion” (319).  Although Elinor, with the help of her mother, 
Mrs. Dashwood, subsequently encourages and assists Marianne in her attempt to control 
her emotions, Marianne has already realized the consequences of her imprudent actions.  
She states, “I saw that my own feelings had prepared my sufferings, and that my want of 
fortitude under them had almost led me to my grave” (322).  She resolves to maintain a 
more sensible lifestyle without her mother or sister explaining the need for this change.  
Therefore, Marianne’s transformation starkly contrasts with Arabella’s, for the latter’s 
conversion is achieved through step-by-step, condescending guidance by a clergyman 
with an all-male cast of supporters (Mr. Glanville and Sir Charles).  With Marianne’s 
initial change, however, Austen does not allow her to be submitted to the patriarchal role 
of woman who needs to be submissive to the guidance of men in order to learn how to be 
a reasonable human being. 
 Furthermore, Marianne does not immediately dedicate herself to a man as the 
still-bedridden Arabella does.  Instead, Marianne devotes herself to Elinor and Mrs. 
Dashwood, stating, “I shall now live solely for my family” (323).  Since her father is 
deceased, Marianne does not have to submit to a male authority figure, even in her 
reformed state.  Her initial transformation also leav s her with the power of controlling 
her life path.  She tells Elinor, “I shall divide every moment between music and reading.  
I have formed my plan, and am determined to enter on a course of serious study . . . From 
you, from my home, I shall never again have the smallest incitement to move” (320-323).  
Elinor smiles at this “same eager fancy” that had before caused Marianne to be selfishly 
indulgent in her emotions and was now being used diligently and appropriately (320).  
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Although Marianne is humbled through her reform, she differs from Arabella in that she 
remains individualistic, spirited, and free from male supervision, as well as exhibiting 
reasoning skills and planning a life of intellectual study.  Austen makes this  
transformation an exercise of self-control and tempred sensibility rather than a lesson in 
the dangers of female autonomy and the need for male guardianship. 
 In Marianne’s transformation, illness temporarily weakens her body so that she 
can see her mistakes, learn from them, and continue o  her life path as a stronger, 
healthier woman.  Arabella’s sickness, though, renders her weak and submissive to men 
in a more permanent way, since she is still weak and in bed while giving herself to Mr. 
Glanville.  Contemporary readers would most likely view her new characterization as 
appropriately feminine.  Discussions of natural andproper gender roles permeate the 
medical writings, conduct books, and philosophical works of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and often novelists joined in these scientific and cultural arguments 
through their characterization of women and men.  For example, in “‘Cruel Disorder’: 
Female Bodies, Eighteenth-Century Fever Narratives, and the Sentimental Novel,” 
Candace Ward explains the “reciprocal relationship” between the sentimental novel and 
medical narratives, arguing that the path of influence was a two-way street between these 
two genres.  The novelists fictionalized the medical discourse of gender difference, while 
the medical narratives gave scientific infrastructure and authority to the gender 
delineations created in novels.  Ward’s argument ca be extended to include conduct 
books and philosophical writings as well, since each of these genres plays a similar role 
in cultural discourse, rather than work in a hierarchical manner where the overtly 
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didactic, intellectual, and scientific writings teach the literary authors how to understand 
the world around them.  The conversation arising from these varying branches of learning  
makes clear just how Lennox and Austen contribute to the discussion of female 
characterization through their reformation narratives.  
 According to Thomas Laqueur, philosophers and medical practitioners of the 
eighteenth century began to write about women and their bodies in a way that diverged 
from the previous understanding of females.  Laqueur makes the following argument: 
 
Thus the old model, in which men and women were arrayed according to their 
degree of metaphysical perfection, their vital heat, along an axis whose telos was 
male, gave way by the late eighteenth century to a new model of difference, of 
biological divergence.  An anatomy and physiology of incommensurability 
replaced a metaphysic of hierarchy in the representatio  of women in relation to 
men. (3) 
 
 
Rather than viewing woman as simply inferior to man, the new model manipulates 
gender lines in a way that renders woman more equal to man in rank but very different 
than man in body, mind, and soul, drastically expanding the traditionally-accepted 
distinctions between the genders.   
 Barker-Benfield develops Laqueur’s work to discuss one of the key factors of this 
new model of gender, arising within the “culture of sensibility,” the idea that the nerves 
of women were more sensitive than the nerves of men.  He posits that the development of 
this concept throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries helped lay the 
“groundwork for bourgeois and scientized evaluation of delicate nerves” (23) which led 
to a “gendering of sensibility” (xxvii).  By the eighteenth century, then, this configuration 
of gender difference that draws a direct correlation between a woman’s socially-accepted 
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traits and her natural constitution was becoming a basic foundation of medical and 
philosophical thought, and this correlation resulted in the belief that females had a more 
heightened level of sensibility than males.  An example can be found in the medical 
writings of the famous Bath physician George Cheyne.  I  his 1733 publication The 
English Malady, Cheyne discusses nervous disorders in both men and women, admitting 
that men can have delicate nerves as well, but his specific case studies reveal an 
evaluation of women as physically weaker than men because of their more sensitive 
nerves.  Furthermore, Cheyne’s description of the nervous system reveals his 
understanding that the soul, brain, and body are constantly in tune with each other: “That 
the Intelligent Principle, or Soul, resides somewhere in the Brain, where all the Nerves, or 
Instruments of Sensation terminate, like a Musician in a finely fram’d and well-tun’d 
Organ-Café; that these Nerves are like Keys, which, being struck on or touch’d convey 
the Sound and Harmony to this sentient Principle, or Musician” (4).  This anatomical 
explanation, then, maintains that a stronger sensibility means a weaker composition in 
general by drawing a direct connection between the nerves and the “Intelligent 
Principle.”  A delicate composition renders a patient weaker and more vulnerable 
physically, mentally and emotionally, and thus woman, the more delicate sex, is 
represented as needing protection and guidance from the ore reasonable and stronger 
gender, man.  Cheyne was not the first medical practitioner to explore the effects of 
delicate nerves and gender sensibility, and his work as not even pioneering in the 
development of this medical thought.  However, his fame among the socialites of Bath, 
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his well-known clients, and his inclusive writing style (with its how-to advice that was 
helpful not only to medical practitioners but to all people that suffered from nervous  
disorders) secured the popularity and pervasiveness of hi  ideas in eighteenth-century 
culture.   
 Barker-Benfield explains that this “gendering of sen ibility and its claim to moral 
superiority promised obvious advantages, including the reform of men on women’s 
terms, but it also carried some dangerous, self-destructive consequences . . . of which 
many cultivators of sensibility were well aware” (xxvii).  This new model viewed women 
as having a “moral authority” and thus a greater capability of teaching manners but 
simultaneously painted women as physically, emotionally, and intellectually weaker 
(xxvii).  One of the harmful consequences, which Barker-Benfield highlights, is 
“women’s temptation to identify themselves as ‘virtue in distress’” (xxvii).  By 
positioning women into a vulnerable state, the rhetoric of these documents implies that 
women inherently need the physical protection and emotional and mental guidance of 
men.  Both Lennox and Austen consider this representatio  of femininity through the 
characterizations of their reformed female charactes, and they both ultimately criticize 
the limitations it places on women through the novels’ conclusions.  Lennox not only 
writes a fantasy of female power that criticizes overt patriarchy, as Doody and Spacks, 
along with other scholars, have argued.  She also indicts the less obvious consequences of 
the gendering of sensibility through writing an unhappy ending for Arabella, who is 
ultimately subjected to the patriarchal model of femininity through the physical 
weakening of her body and spirit.  Austen also rejects this particular model of 
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womanhood in the writing of Marianne’s initial transformation in order to counteract the 
popular idea of woman as weak and in need of guardianship.  By exposing the 
possibilities and opportunities of womanhood existing outside of this limiting female 
model through the promising characterization of Marianne after her initial 
transformation, Austen renders the novel’s unhappy conclusion, which entails a second 
transformation that strips Marianne of her vibrant character and subjugates her to a man, 
even more disheartening and indicative of Austen’s criticism of this insidious model of 
femininity.   
 The “virtue in distress” or vulnerable model of femininity frequently appears in 
eighteenth-century literature, and Samuel Richardson’s famous novel Clarissa published 
in 1748 illustrates it perfectly.  Clarissa Harlowe, d scribed as virtuous, but also “poor, 
weak, and defenceless” (169), reforms several male characters by the novel’s conclusion 
with her sensibility and moral fortitude, among them John Belford, the libertine friend of 
her captor and rapist Robert Lovelace.  Her story is a tragedy, however, because she is 
unable to save herself, in spite of her virtuous character and her multiple attempts to run 
away from Lovelace, and because the men in her life fa l to be appropriate guardians.  
Clarissa exemplifies the ideal female with her weak body and delicate nerves, her need 
for man’s protection (from other men such as Lovelac ), and her moral superiority and 
ability to reform men.  Although this role provides women with advantageous positions 
of power in the reformation of rakish men, as Barker-B nfield explains, this construction 
of femininity limits women by necessitating masculine guardianship over the physically 
and emotionally delicate females.  
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 By the second half of the eighteenth century, the example of the weak female had 
become not only an ideal but the appropriate model of what a woman should be.  Dr. 
John Gregory, in his popular conduct book A Father’s Legacy To His Daughters, first 
published in 1774, summarizes this feminine ideal in the following quotation: “But 
though good health be one of the greatest blessings of life, never make a boast of it, but 
enjoy it in grateful silence . . . We so naturally associate the idea of female softness and 
delicacy with a correspondent delicacy of constitution, that when a woman speaks of her 
great strength . . . her ability to bear excessive fatigue, we recoil at the description” (23).  
Gregory employs rhetoric arising from the culture of sensibility throughout this book, 
constantly addressing the different levels of sensibility between the sexes and thus 
teaching his daughters the socially-accepted behavior for women that is appropriate to 
their weaker constitution.  The value of his work in interpreting Austen’s and Lennox’s 
heroines lies in the fact that it is not a treatise or a medical document that attempts to use 
reason or science to prove these gender distinctions, but rather a cultural snapshot of how 
eighteenth-century society inculcated the rhetoric f gendered sensibility, along with all 
of its limitations placed on women.  The gender distinction reflected in this quotation 
entails the cultural expectation for women to exhibit delicacy and vulnerability in order to 
be socially successful. 
 In The Female Quixote illness finally forces Arabella into this model of the weak 
woman dependent on men.  Arabella, with her impressiv  ability to reason, her control of 
men, and her power to make decisions and even move ar und without much guidance, 
exhibits qualities that were culturally and medically deemed as masculine, but she is 
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made appropriately feminine again through the weakening of her body.  However, the 
novel’s contrived and quick conclusion reveals Lennox’s criticism of this insidiously 
oppressive representation of women.  After the conversation with the clergyman, 
Arabella realizes she has been wrong in her adherenc  to romantic conventions, and she 
continues “for near two Hours afterwards wholly absor ’d in the most disagreeable 
Reflections on the Absurdity of her past Behavior” (383).  Although this humiliation 
seems reasonable to the reader, because Arabella has exposed herself to “Contempt and 
Ridicule” through her delusional behavior (383), the abrupt conclusion also leaves the 
reader unsatisfied.  Immediately after these two hours f remorse, Arabella tells Mr. 
Glanville the following: “To give you myself . . . with all my remaining Imperfections, is 
making you but a poor Present” (383).  Arabella quickly submits herself to the 
appropriate, safe role, predetermined by her father, as a wife to Mr. Glanville, and then 
the story suddenly ends.  Earlier in the novel, Arabella is praised for the “Strength of her 
Understanding” and “her lively Wit” (116-117), but these personality traits, more 
appropriate to a man rather than a woman, disappear after her reformation.  This loss of 
personality and stifling of character resists the happy-ending convention typical to comic 
domestic novels that so often end with marriage. 
 This seemingly hurried conclusion was not Lennox’s original plan for the novel.  
Richardson, in a letter dated just months before the publication of The Female Quixote, 
advised Lennox to “finish [her] Heroine’s cure in [her] present volumes” rather than in 
the “proposed 3d Volume” (Letter 424).  Of course, cholars have speculated what kind 
of conclusion Lennox had initially intended to write, and one popular guess entails the 
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gradual curing of Arabella by the Countess, an admirable woman “who among her own 
Sex had no Superior in Wit, Elegance, and Ease [and] was inferior to very few of the 
other in Sense, Learning, and Judgment” (322).  Because the Countess “herself had when 
very young, been deep read in Romances” (323), she is able to begin a conversation with 
Arabella about her quixotic delusions that “rais’d a Kind of Tumult in [Arabella’s] 
Thoughts” (540) but did so in a natural, gradual way, with the two intelligent women 
discussing the topic of Romances in a rational but congenial manner.  However, the 
Countess is quickly removed from the scene before she is able to complete her task of 
curing Arabella.  As Duncan Isles explains in his appendix to the Oxford edition of the 
novel, the Countess’ attempt to cure Arabella “begins so promisingly and yet is 
abandoned so abruptly and oddly,” leaving the published conclusion with the divine 
doctor’s quick curing of Arabella “stilted and unconvincing” (425-426).  Debra Malina 
responds to Isle’s oft-quoted interpretation with the following question: “If the 
Countess’s cure was to be replaced by the clergyman’s, why retain the Countess half-
episode at all?” (290).  She then makes the insightful argument that Lennox utilizes the 
abandoned Countess story in order to criticize the doctor’s method of curing:  
 
[It] would seem to suggest that she had left traces of the almost-absent mother for 
a reason.  They mark Arabella’s deprivation of maternal influence, as the doctor 
leads her into the man’s world of rationalism.  Like Richardson’s and Johnson’s 
advice in the man’s world of serious literature, the clergyman’s reasons may have 
a great deal of validity for the ‘realistic’ thinker, but that both imply a requisite 
repression of the mother suggests that both rely not o  value-neutral intelligence 
or ‘sanity’ but on coercion. (290-291) 
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Not only a mother figure, the Countess represents the possibility of an intelligent female 
counselor and model that could guide Arabella into a reasonable lifestyle without 
submitting her to the culture of sensibility’s weak womanhood that requires masculine 
supervision and instruction.  This promising “half-episode” draws attention to the 
disagreeable aspect of the published conclusion that the doctor’s curing, or “coercion,” 
yields.  Furthermore, the fact that Arabella is still bedridden and not fully recovered from 
her illness when she changes her ways and submits to marrying Mr. Glanville renders the 
quick conclusion even more disappointing.  Completely and quickly “cured,” she is left 
humiliated, objectified, and stripped of her once vibrant character in order to be made 
submissive to man and thus properly feminine. 
 Scholars have agreed that through this reformation Arabella seems to be 
transformed from a beautiful, proud, mostly intelligent (albeit confused) woman into a 
degenerate, undeserving object, a “poor Present” as Arabella calls herself (383).  For 
instance, George Haggerty maintains that Arabella “undergoes a transformation that 
renders her . . . alien from her earlier self,” and he concludes that the novel’s abrupt, “all-
too-pat conclusion” leaves the reader unsatisfied (135).  Instead, the transformed Arabella 
embodies Lennox’s criticism of the cultural values that forced females into the limiting 
gender role of the weak woman who needs protection and subjugated them to man’s 
control.  Lennox highlights the dangers of accepting he notion of “incommensurable” 
gender differences promulgated in the eighteenth century, for although these newer 
gender lines seem progressive in giving women a moral superiority that can help reform 
men’s manners, they ultimately stifle women’s ability to express themselves.  The abrupt 
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ending suppresses Arabella’s personality when she is forced into the patriarchal ideal of a 
woman in need of man’s guidance and makes the novel’s marital conclusion lacking and  
disappointing.  Lennox highlights and confronts this adverse consequence of accepting 
the appropriate model of woman promulgated by the culture of sensibility. 
 The denouement of Marianne’s story is also disappointing, but, unlike Arabella’s 
plot, it follows a reformation narrative that combats the model of the subservient woman.  
Through Marianne’s penitent but assertive response to h r illness, Austen gives a brief 
representation of what a female character’s reformation could look like without painting 
the feminine ideal as physically, mentally, and emotionally weak.  One aspect of the 
model female that Austen particularly contradicts with her characterization of a reformed 
Marianne is the idea that women were less capable of intense reasoning and strenuous 
study than men.  This overtly degrading characteristic of woman was of course not a new 
concept developed entirely within the culture of sensibility during the eighteenth century.  
As Laqueur explains, man held an overall higher position than woman in dealings with 
the body, mind, and soul in the “hierarchical” classification of gender that preceded the 
“incommensurable” structure of gender based on sensibility.  What changed in the 
eighteenth century, then, was the particular way in which women were described as less 
capable of rigorous mental activity.  Medical practitioners, philosophers, and authors 
employed the doctrine of delicate nerves to give sci ntific proof to the biological 
difference between the mental capacities of men and women.  This new gender 
classification masqueraded as a system in which women were represented as drastically 
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different from men rather than inferior to men, appearing to be beneficial to women and 
feministic movements; however, the development of this gendering based on sensibility  
aided in the subjection of woman to man by insidiously representing women as mentally 
inferior to men. 
 For example, Bernard de Mandeville’s Treatise of Hypochondriack and Hysterick 
Passions, first published in 1711, anticipates Cheyne’s correlation between the nerves 
and rest of the human composition to include an explicit connection between women’s 
weak nerves and their weak constitution in general, inc uding a weak mind.  Within his 
explanation of how nerves work, Mandeville explains the characteristics that apply to 
women because of their delicate nerves:  
 
This Delicacy as well as Imbecility of the Spirits in Women is conspicuous in all  
their Actions, those of the Brain not excepted: They are unfit both for abstruse 
and elaborate Thoughts, all Studies of Depth, Coherence and Solidity, that fatigue 
the Spirits, and require a Steadiness and Assiduity of thinking; but where the 
Advantages of Education and Knowledge are equal, they exceed the Men in 
Sprightliness of Fancy, Quickness of Thought and off-hand Wit; as much as they 
out-do them in Sweetness of Voice, and Volubility of T ngue. (247) 
 
The rhetoric of this argument exemplifies the attempt to express gender in terms of 
difference rather than hierarchy, for although Mandeville is attacking women’s reasoning 
skills he immediately discusses their mental strengths, such as their active imagination 
and quick wit.  This seemingly beneficial but actually detrimental gendering of sensibility 
produces the ideal woman that Austen and Lennox criticize through their 
characterizations of Arabella and Marianne. 
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Similarly, Gregory’s conduct book reveals how eighteenth-century society 
normalized this particular representation of the ideal woman.  In his chapter entitled 
“Religion,” Gregory teaches the specific approach to spiritual life that is appropriate to 
women.  He begins with the following assessment of women: “The natural softness and 
sensibility of your dispositions particularly fit you for the practice of those duties where 
the heart is chiefly concerned” (15).  His premise leads to instruction about proper studies 
for women, in which he encourages them to read religious texts that are “addressed to the 
heart . . . not such [that] entangle you in an endlss maze of opinions and systems” (19-
20).  He advises his daughters to “not meddle with controversy,” meaning complex, 
scholarly works, since they may cause women to “plunge into a chaos from which you 
will never be able to extricate yourselves” (18).  Arabella’s reasoning skills fit for a 
“figure in Parliament” and the reformed Marianne’s admirable goal of a life dedicated to 
“serious study” contradict the cultural paradigm of the female in Gregory’s conduct book 
in a way that causes readers to question the validity of this gender distinction.   
 Although Lennox and Austen criticize these detrimental characteristics applied to 
women through the culture of sensibility, they both ultimately submit their female 
characters to the socially proper role of woman in their novels’ disheartening outcomes.  
Austen’s ending for Marianne seems even more disheartening than Arabella’s 
conclusion.  Through the characterization of Marianne after her first transformation, 
respectable and gracious but also independent and studious, Austen indulges in the 
fantasy of women thriving and expressing themselves in a world that does not subjugate 
them to the restrictive cultural depiction of females.  Ultimately, though, the fantasy 
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comes to an end in the realistic conclusion of the domestic novel.  Austen may rewrite the 
female reformation narrative at first, by not allowing illness to subjugate woman to man, 
but in the end she submits Marianne to the conventional, patriarchal denouement by 
rejecting her self-made plan of secluded study and placing her into a disappointing 
marriage with an ill-matched suitor. 
 A more traditional interpretation of Marianne’s con lusion, however, finds her 
marriage to be a respectable and even fortunate outcome for a woman in her situation, 
and this argument is most eloquently explained in Claudia Johnson’s works.  Johnson 
maintains that Austen writes a happy conclusion for Ma ianne because she does not 
include the typical ending for love-hurt women: death.  She explains that “women abused 
in love are expected to die . . . This is what ‘conventionally’ happens in sentimental 
novels, and this is what everyone, with untroubled matter-of-factness, expects from 
Marianne” (“A ‘Sweet Face’” 165).  Since second attachments are not readily accepted 
by society, these injured women are considered useles  and become a “financial burden 
on family” (“A ‘Sweet Face’” 165): 
 
From the standpoint of sensibility and the social structure it serves, a woman’s 
readiness to form second attachments always appears gros  and improper . . . 
because it gives her an unladylike parity in the conduct of her sentimental and 
erotic life, a parity that challenges the primacy of male choice and thus unsettles 
the economy governing what anthropologists call the “ raffic in women.” (“A 
‘Sweet Face’” 167) 
 
 
Thus, the death of a female character who has been aba doned by her first love “spares 
us the mess of lasting conflict and the necessity of social change” (“A ‘Sweet Face’” 
166).  This narrative practice of killing off injured female characters is epitomized by 
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Samuel Richardson’s novel Clarissa, in which the femal  protagonist dies from suffering 
the emotional injuries caused by the mistreatment of Robert Lovelace.  Johnson explains 
that Austen undermines this misogynistic tradition, promulgated by the culture of 
sensibility’s “virtue in distress” model, by allowing the love-hurt Marianne to live and 
form a second attachment. 
 However, Johnson misreads Marianne’s reformation.  She summarizes the 
conclusion of the novel as Marianne being “yanked back [from death] into a happy 
second attachment and a happy marriage” (“A ‘Sweet Face’” 173, Johnson’s emphasis), 
and argues elsewhere that although “Marianne changes her opinions about second 
attachments . . . she is never obliged to surrender to the ‘commonplace,’ ‘gross,’ and 
‘illiberal’” ( Jane Austen 72).  Johnson concludes her interpretation with the following 
commonly-accepted argument: “Sense and Sensibility grants [Marianne] the highest 
happiness it can imagine” (Jane Austen 72).  I argue that Marianne is subjected to the 
“commonplace” and “gross,” and though her ending is not a tragedy, in no way does 
Austen offer her the “highest happiness.”    
 A close analysis of the novel’s ending reveals that Austen’s description of this 
marital conclusion does not comply with the typical h ppy endings of domestic novels.  
Colonel Brandon is chosen for Marianne by her half brother for fiscal reasons and by her 
mother and sister for sympathy towards him, and through this betrothal she becomes 
objectified, muted, and subordinated into the approriate patriarchal role for the reformed 
woman.  Unlike Arabella who has developed a friendly yet intimate relationship with and 
an obvious affection for Mr. Glanville throughout the novel and whose marriage is 
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described as exhibiting “every Virtue and laudable Aff ction of the Mind” (383), 
Marianne vehemently dislikes Colonel Brandon for most of the novel.  Early in Volume 
I, Marianne describes the proposition of desiring Colonel Brandon as “ridiculous” and an 
“absurdity” (39), claiming that he is old enough to be her father and “has neither genius, 
taste, nor spirit . . . his understanding has no brilliancy, his feelings no ardour, and his 
voice no expression” (53).  In the final volume, even Elinor, who is one of the novel’s 
most sensible voices, doubts the appropriateness of the union, for she cannot argue for 
compatibility between the two based on “their age, characters, or feelings” even after 
Mrs. Dashwood has revealed, albeit with her added “natural embellishments,” that 
Colonel Brandon does in fact love Marianne (314).  Austen writes the final description 
for the couple with as pleasant a tone as most domestic novel marital conclusions are 
given, stating that Colonel Brandon was as happy as he deserved to be and that because 
“Marianne could never love by halves . . . her whole heart became, in time, as much 
devoted to her husband, as it had once been to Willughby” (352).  But the overall 
description of their relationship and marriage prevents the scrutinizing reader from 
delighting in the ill-suited match. 
 Moreover, the extermination of Marianne’s agency and spirited character through 
this marriage also spoils any attempt to read it asa happy ending.  The narrator describes 
Marianne’s consent to marriage in the following passage: 
 
With such a confederacy against her . . . what could she do? . . . instead of 
remaining even for ever with her mother, and finding her only pleasures in 
retirement and study, as afterwards in her more calm and sober judgment she had  
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determined on,―she found herself at nineteen, submitting to new attachments, 
entering on new duties, placed in a new home, a wife, a mistress of a family, and 
the patroness of a village. (351-352)   
 
With the exception of Marianne “voluntarily” giving her hand to Colonel Brandon (352), 
the language of this conclusion suppresses her power, abolishes her independence, and 
annihilates her voice, since Marianne does not speak at ll in the conclusion, and this 
repressive language contrasts the language of agency used to describe the decision to live 
a secluded life of study that “she had determined” using “calm and sober judgment.”  The 
plot objectifies and transforms Marianne from a reasoning, independent woman to a prize 
for the deserving Colonel Brandon.  Elinor concludes that “the reward of her sister was 
due” to Colonel Brandon for “his sufferings and hisconstancy” (313).  In fact, the entire 
Dashwood family, along with Elinor’s new husband Edward, “felt [Colonel Brandon’s] 
sorrows, and their own obligations,” thus “Marianne, by general consent, was to be the 
reward of all” (351).  Although Austen allows the love-hurt Marianne to escape death, 
her vibrant, individualistic character does not survive, giving this novel a more realistic 
rather than comic conclusion since female subjugation to a less-than-compatible husband, 
often arranged by the families, happened too often.  
 Johnson’s understanding of Marianne’s marriage as a relatively happy ending 
represents a more traditional analysis of this characte ’s outcome, but other examples of 
Austen scholarship explore more nuanced interpretations of this character’s problematic 
conclusion.  A. Walton Litz recognizes the disappointing aspects of the marriage between 
Colonel Brandon and Marianne but attributes this perplexing ending “to the fact that Jane 
Austen was working against her inclinations and talents [and] was the victim of 
29 
 
conventions,” arguing that only later in her novel-writing did she develop good 
characterization skills that counteracted the standards of “moralistic fiction” (82-83).  
While some scholars, including Tanner and Seeber, analyze Marianne’s marriage and 
overall conclusion in a similar vein and find the ending purposefully disappointing, they 
fail to recognize her multi-staged reformation that le ds to a clearer understanding of 
what Austen represents through this character and the novel as a whole.  Austen 
highlights the possibilities of a non-restrictive, non-patriarchal reform by not submitting 
the female character weakened by illness to the vulnerable model of femininity in which 
she requires masculine guidance and protection, and this promising initial transformation 
makes the conclusion even more unnatural and unsatisfying.  Thus, Austen undermines 
these suppressive gender distinctions by writing a dis ppointing marital conclusion.  She 
attacks the cultural idea that women were physically, emotionally, and mentally weaker, 
in need of man’s guardianship, and therefore unsuitable for a solitary, autonomous life of 
study.   
The Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in his important treatise 
Émile, ou de l’éducation published in 1762 and translated to English the following year, 
attempted to give validity to this subjugated role f woman by first distinguishing woman 
from man using rhetoric that had evolved from the gendering of sensibility: “The man 
should be strong and active; the woman should be weak and passive; the one must have 
both the power and the will; it is enough that the other should offer little resistance” 
(384).  This assumption of gender distinctions then leads Rousseau to make the following 
argument for women’s appropriate role in society: “It follows that woman is specifically 
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made for man’s delight . . . A woman’s education must therefore be planned in relation to 
man. To be pleasing in his sight, to win his respect and love, to train him in childhood, to 
tend him in manhood, to counsel and console, to make his life pleasant and happy, these 
are the duties of woman for all time” (384, 388).  Rousseau’s argument is a perfect 
example of the consequences detrimental to women and ge der equality that could and 
did arise from accepting the model of woman based on gendered sensibility, and Austen 
reveals this dangerous effect by rendering Marianne’s conclusion, which tells the story of 
a happy, reasonable, and studious woman subjugated to he role of pleasing a man, a sad 
and disappointing one.  
 Through this critique of Rousseau’s ideal woman, Austen aligns herself with 
several radical female authors of the long eighteenth century.  Mary Astell, in A Serious 
Proposal to the Ladies, for the Advancement of Their True and Greatest Interest, 
published in 1694, encouraged females in their choice f a secluded lifestyle of study, 
arguing that a woman who is “not content to be wife and good her self alone . . . 
endeavors to propagate Wisdom and Piety to all within her Sphere” (104).  Austen’s plot 
parallels Astell’s proposition for women to be single and live outside of public society 
through Marianne’s initial reformation, and although Austen is writing her novel over a 
century after Astell’s treatise, society was still very wary of women living outside of the 
realm of men.  Marianne’s story also parallels some concepts from Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman.  In this famous manifesto, 
published in 1792, Wollstonecraft responds directly to Rousseau and his description of 
the ideal woman through overt criticism of this limiting gender discrimination.  
31 
 
Wollstonecraft states that woman “was not created mrely to be the solace of man, and 
the sexual should not destroy the human character” (142).  The latter statement illustrates 
well the problematic endings of Austen’s as well as Lennox’s novels, for the complex  
personalities of Marianne and Arabella are both destroyed when they must succumb to 
this restricting role of woman as weak, passive, and subjected to man.   
 Pairing the radical early feminist Wollstonecraft wi h the socially-accepted 
novelists Lennox and Austen, who conclude almost every lead female character’s story 
with a betrothal to a man, may seem bizarre, but as Deborah Ross explains, “Women 
novelists [of this time] persisted in presenting the real universe, showing its unfairness 
without advocating rebellion” (470).  The conventioal plot lines of The Female Quixote 
and Sense and Sensibility do not cry out for a revolution, as Wollstonecraft’s writing 
does, but they are also n t conservative domestic novels that support the patriarchal norm 
by rewarding all of the female characters with happy endings for submitting to men in 
marriage.  Instead, these novels paint Arabella’s and Marianne’s conclusions as 
particularly disappointing in order to criticize the social consequences of accepting the 
gendering of sensibility and the disturbing constrain s it places on women.  
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman stirred up controversy to the point 
that it became infamous in many households; among sme other outraged 
contemporaries, the famous polemicist Hannah More claimed that she was “invincibly 
resolved not to [read] it” (427).  Meanwhile, the novels of Austen and Lennox, 
subversive in a quieter and more subtle way, slipped easily into the mainstream of female  
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authorship and widespread readership of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, leaving insightful readers questioning the social constructions of gender roles 
that restricted their freedom. 
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MELVILLE’S BARTLEBY: A PERFECTLY-CRAFTED ANOMALY 
 
 
Writing to his brother-in-law John C. Hoadley in 1877, Herman Melville 
concludes a letter, or what he calls his “queer sort of an absurd scribbling,” with the 
following statement: “Life is so short, and so ridiculous and irrational (from a certain 
point of view) that one knows not what to make of it unless―well, finish the sentence for 
yourself” (454).  And after proclaiming in a letter to Nathaniel Hawthorne dated 
November, 1851, that in spite of doubting his own sa ity at times he is in fact “not mad,” 
Melville calmly admits, “But truth is ever incoherent” (213).  These quotations, along 
with others from Melville’s letters and published works, exhibit the overall tone of his 
short story “Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street,” first published in Putnam’s 
Monthly Magazine in 1853 and then included in a collection of Melville’s short stories 
entitled The Piazza Tales three years later.  In the eyes of the story’s narrato , Bartleby is 
“ridiculous and irrational” and “ever incoherent.”  The narrator’s obsession with fully 
understanding Bartleby and his ultimate failure to do so not only exists within the 
fictional boundaries of Melville’s short story but also extends into the reality of the 
“Bartleby Industry” (x), the term Dan McCall gives to the large group of scholars who 
have written about this complicated character.  Andthough many excellent members of 
the “Bartleby Industry” (x) have composed eloquent interpretations that describe Bartleby 
as resisting capitalistic control, symbolizing Melville’s literary frustrations, suffering 
from clinical depression or autism, or participating  some other 
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discourse arising from that particular scholar’s critical methodology, overall Bartleby has 
remained what the narrator dubbed him, “the inscrutable scrivener” (50).  As a whole, his 
actions seem illogical, his motives unknowable, andhis character unclassifiable.   
 Instead of making another attempt to clearly identify what or who Bartleby 
represents, I examine the critical responses to this complex and problematic character, 
analyze the obsession with understanding and interpreting Bartleby, and explain the 
social criticism Melville implies through writing such an unsolvable riddle of a story 
whose main character obstinately resists simplificat on.  Through a personification of 
reality’s ambiguity and irrationality in the character of Bartleby, Melville exposes and 
denounces society’s compulsion to read people as normalized identity types.  
Furthermore, I argue that through this characterization of life filled with contradictions 
and complexities that are simply unacceptable to the narrator and readers, Melville 
ultimately critiques the limiting understandings of humanity, masculinity, and individual 
freedom emerging in antebellum America. 
 The narrator, a “rather elderly” lawyer, begins history with meticulously 
detailed descriptions of each person, including himself, that worked in his office on Wall 
Street prior to the arrival of his newest hire, Bartleby, claiming that “some mention of 
myself, my employees, my business, my chambers, and general surroundings . . . [are] 
indispensable to an adequate understanding of the chief character about to be presented” 
(19).  The only names of the three employees given ar  their “nicknames,” which the 
narrator explains were “mutually conferred upon each other by my three clerks, and were 
deemed expressive of their respective persons or chara ters” (21).  In fact, the only 
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character within the story’s plot line who is given a ame other than a job title or 
nickname describing their character traits is the lead character Bartleby, and this is 
expressive of his complex personality’s resistance to simplification.  The temperaments 
and habits of the two copyists Turkey and Nippers and the office-boy Ginger-Nut are 
described as easily knowable and interpreted in a smple, causal manner.  For example, 
the “eccentricities” of Turkey and Nippers are methodically attributed to the former’s 
“self-indulgent habits” and subsequent embodiment of “a man whom prosperity harmed” 
and to the latter’s victimization by “two evil powers―ambition and indigestion” (24-26).  
By rationalizing the neuroses of each character, th narrator reveals his understanding of 
people as easily comprehensible and thus classifiable. 
 Bartleby, however, trumps this simplistic worldview, for the narrator immediately 
describes this scrivener as “the strangest I ever saw . . . of whom nothing is ascertainable, 
except from the original sources, and, in his case, those are very small” (19).  
Nevertheless, the narrator spends most of the storya tempting to ascertain this 
unascertainable character, but with no true avail.  He tries to reason with Bartleby in 
order to understand why the scrivener responds to customary work requests with the 
following statement of “passive resistance” (33-34): “I would prefer not to” (29).  The 
narrator’s constant assumptions as to why the scrivener would exhibit such 
“extraordinary conduct” reveals his desperate need for some kind of understanding of this 
odd character (31).  According to the narrator’s asses ment, Bartleby is a “perfectly 
honest man” (61), “means no mischief . . . intends o insolence” (34), and “of such a 
gentlemanly organization” (51) but is also “inflexible” (46), “unaccountably eccentric” 
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(61), and possibly “a little deranged” (63).  When the narrator first realizes that Bartleby 
is living alone in the office, he exclaims, “What miserable friendlessness and loneliness 
are here revealed!” (39), followed by a proposition t  readers to imagine how this 
lifestyle would cause a man to become forlorn like Bartleby.  And after snooping through 
Bartleby’s desk, the narrator makes the following diagnosis: “What I saw that morning 
persuaded me that the scrivener was a victim of innate and incurable disorder” (42).  
Despite this admission that Bartleby was “incurable,” the narrator continues to struggle 
with his fixation on understanding and fixing the ecc ntric Bartleby until the very end of 
the story.  Removing Bartleby from the office, which the narrator does when the 
scrivener has entirely stopped doing work, in no way removes him from the narrator’s 
mind. 
 Bartleby has also not spent a day outside of the mind of literary scholarship since 
the revival of interest in Melville’s works in the early twentieth century.  Dan McCall’s 
The Silence of Bartleby explains this literary phenomenon eloquently: “By itself, the 
story warrants―may even require―elaborate analysis.  But going through the 
voluminous criticism and scholarship devoted to ‘Bartleby,’ I felt more than once that I 
had lost the story” (x).  McCall focuses his two-fold criticism of Bartleby scholarship on 
“readers’ desires to identify and secure Melville within their own rather than his 
contexts” (Milton 19)2 and the subsequent loss of an appreciation for the emotions 
                                                           
2 McCall quotes Stern Milton here, a critic who McCall assumes to be “one of the best writers on the tale,” 
in order to explain his difficulties with the analysis of Bartleby by the “various critical schools” (x). 
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Melville’s story evokes because “such efforts to enrich the story may actually impoverish 
it, diverting us from the sense of wonder and pain that it provides” (98).  In a similar 
vein, I argue that at times these meticulous methodological approaches distract us from 
looking at the story from a “big picture” point of view, but instead of focusing my 
analysis on the “sense of wonder and pain” that the s ory arouses, I look at the frustration 
and desperation for understanding that the story invokes in its readers and the ideological 
perspective that arises from an analysis of this particular effect.  With the typical 
interpretations produced by these scholars, using critical lenses ranging from New 
Historicism to psychoanalysis, that attempt to define Bartleby in the most complete way 
possible, the story loses its profound sense of the inability to completely understand the 
mindset of other human beings due to the contradictions and ambiguities within a 
person’s character rendering him or her resistant to simplification. 
 Melville scholar M. Thomas Inge recognizes this salient aspect of the text; in fact, 
the story’s puzzling factor is what inspired his book Bartleby the Inscrutable, a collection 
of literary analyses of Bartleby from a variety of critical methods, “contradictory and in 
some instances openly hostile to the others” in order to “demonstrate some of the variety 
of opinions” (10).  In the book’s short preface, Inge makes the following astute 
assessment of “Bartleby”: “It is one of those few stories in English, or any other 
language, which will continue to defy any definitive or generally satisfactory explication, 
and this may finally be its theme, of course―that the inscrutable does not yield one iota 
to the rational categories of existence” (9).  Inge makes no attempt to explore this theme, 
though, asserting that “by no means is this book meant to conclude anything about the 
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story, aside from its inscrutability” (10).  I, however, explore some of the implications 
that emanate from such a perfectly inscrutable story and attempt to reveal the ideological 
stance behind the narrator’s as well as scholars’ vehement attempts to, as Inge explains, 
“fix [Bartleby] in a formulated phrase” (10).  
 Many critics quickly mention this issue of inscrutability in their analyses of 
Bartleby but do not fully explore it.  Instead, they r veal how Bartleby can be rendered 
comprehensible using a particular methodological approach.  Although several of the 
scholarly works that I examine in the following pages are excellent and necessary in 
understanding Melville’s works, “Bartleby the Scrivener,” along with other complex 
stories, entices scholars to sometimes explain the unexplainable and to do so with 
emotional responses or political agendas that are not always warranted in the text.  For 
example, David Kuebrich attempts to prove that Bartleby is looking for salvation by 
closely analyzing two of the moments when Bartleby ver so slightly modifies his 
famous “I prefer not to” phrase.  He argues that in these two specific moments Bartleby 
“considers the possibility of relaxing his resistance” (402), and these episodes reveal that 
“meaningful communication is possible, and Bartleby is open to change but prudently 
awaits further evidence of a genuine transformation on the part of the lawyer” (403).  The 
only evidence given for this argument is that Bartleby adds “at present” to his phrase “I 
prefer not to” after two moments in which the narrato  attempts a “friendly and even 
quasi-familial relationship” with Bartleby, and Kuebrich states that through these 
particular modifications “Bartleby implies that he may become more cooperative in the 
future” (402).  However, Kuebrich fails to mention that the narrator attempts to make 
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“friendly and even quasi-familial” connections with Bartleby several other times in the 
story, and Bartleby does not react to these other gestures in a way that implies he feels 
hopeful.  Although parts of Kuebrich’s argument aresound and helpful, he seems to be 
concocting this particular aspect of Bartleby in order to prove his overall argument that 
Bartleby is seeking help, producing an interpretation hat strays too far from the text to be 
considered accurate.  These sloppy interpretations, though, reveal how this story 
provokes scholar’s compulsion to either explain the un xplainable or manipulate the 
ambiguous parts of the text in order to fit them into a larger argument or political agenda 
that does not truly exist within the text.  I find both the approaches that are less than 
thorough as well as the explanations that remain more faithful to the text helpful in my 
examination of responses to this story because they both represent an overall critical 
choice not to fully and unabashedly explore the inscrutability of Bartleby. 
 Psychoanalytical explanations have been especially popular among the attempts 
to define the indefinable character of Bartleby.  Scholars in this field have interpreted his 
eccentric behavior as expressive of a variety of mental disorders delineated in the 
American Psychiatric Association’s The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM).  Morris Beja’s “Bartleby and Schizophrenia” explains that for the 
scrivener, “schizophrenia becomes a refuge―the awful result of a desperate attempt to 
avoid insanity” (560).  Whitehead, Liese, and O’Dell, in “Melville’s ‘Bartleby the 
Scrivener’: A Case Study,” make the following claim: “Using DSM-III-R criteria, it can 
be concluded that Bartleby’s Axis I diagnosis was major depression,” though they admit 
that interpreting Bartleby’s behavior is a “considerable challenge” due to Melville’s “rich 
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and problematic narrative” (21).  And more recently, Stuart Murray, in Representing 
Autism: Culture, Narrative, Fascination, describes Melville’s story as “the great literary 
text of autistic presence” (50).  Although often-quoted by other scholars, these analyses 
have had their fair share of criticism; for example, Kuebrich argues that several of these 
psychoanalytical arguments, including Beja’s article, “divest the story of its social 
significance” (402, note 26).  However, what has not yet been assessed about this type of 
analysis is its eradication of the actual character of Bartleby that is riddled with 
contradictions and ambiguities.  I argue that Bartleby’s eccentric behavior does not easily 
lend itself to the limiting classifications of the DSM definitions.  Of course Bartleby 
could be depressed, but Melville significantly refuses to give us any insight into 
Bartleby’s thoughts and motives that would allow us to make a confident diagnosis.  
Furthermore, this diagnosis of depression conflicts wi h what Maurice Blanchot calls 
Bartleby’s “radical form of passivity” (17) or for what the narrator dubs Bartleby’s 
“passive resistance” (33-34) exhibited in the scrivener’s determined one-liner “I would 
prefer not to” (29) that he rarely utters in a way that suggests melancholy.  Both 
descriptions of Bartleby, that he is depressed and that he is radically and rebelliously 
passive, are valid and helpful in trying to understand this character but do not succeed in 
identifying Bartleby in a concrete manner.  Although I am not dismissing these case 
studies in any way, Bartleby’s complicated character annot be grasped in its entirety 
within this type of definitive analysis.  The complete Bartleby, the text’s Bartleby with all 
of his ambiguities, is lost when placed under the psychoanalyst’s diagnostic gaze. 
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 William Sullivan’s “Bartleby and Infantile Autism: A Naturalistic Explanation” 
illustrates what is lost in psychoanalytical criticism of Bartleby’s inscrutable character. 
Although speaking of autism within the context of mid-nineteenth-century literature may 
seem anachronistic and a little ridiculous, scholars such as Stuart Murray, Amit 
Pinchevski, Ashley Kern Koegel, and Oliver Steinert-Lieschied have written works 
relating Bartleby’s behavior to autism, and Sullivan’s essay, an intelligent and 
respectable analysis, is often quoted by other critics, especially those interested in 
psychoanalysis.  What I find problematic in Sullivan’s analysis, and in other critical 
works that diagnose Bartleby with mental disorders, is the identification of Bartleby as “a 
man with incurable organic illness” who desperately needs help (Sullivan 57), not unlike 
the narrator’s understanding of Bartleby as “the victim of innate and incurable disorder” 
suffering from “excessive and organic ill” (Melville “Bartleby” 42).  Sullivan states that 
“those familiar with infantile autism should readily recognize that Bartleby is a high-
functioning autistic adult” (46), supporting this diagnosis with evidence revealing that 
“Bartleby has the leading characteristics of infantile autism, extreme aloneness, 
preservation of sameness, and difficulty with communication” (50).  Although I respect 
this recognition, I argue that this analysis victimizes Bartleby in a way that the text does 
not support.  Sullivan explains that “Bartleby in every way fits the pattern of a reasonably 
successful, coping, autistic adult, whose tragedy is that he almost succeeded in finding 
the structured environment and understanding personal supervisor he needed” (44).  He 
explains Bartleby’s eccentricities as simply the eff cts of autism: “When too much 
pressure was put on him, his autistic symptoms were aggravated and he withdrew 
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completely and resolutely, eventually dying of inanitio ” (49).  According to Sullivan, 
Bartleby only “prefers not to” because he is mentally ill and unaided by people who 
understand his mental disorder.  Describing the scrivener as helpless and in need of a 
caretaker, however, strips the character of any intelligence or self-awareness to choose 
the way he acts, which ultimately eliminates the possibility for other important insights 
into the story, such as the credible historicist interpretation of Melville’s story that reveals 
a criticism of Wall Street and the injustices of wage labor in Bartleby’s actions.  
Although the narrator views Bartleby as someone in need of help, Bartleby resists this 
identification not only by refusing help but doing so often with a resolute and sound 
mind.  I am not contending that Bartleby is in no way exemplifying autism.  However, 
Sullivan’s naturalistic argument that Bartleby is a copy of a real-life autistic adult not 
only ignores Melville’s representation of Bartleby as a complicated character with 
ambiguous and often unknowable motives but also forces the scrivener into a character 
role that is not justified by the text, the role of a victim suffering from a medical disorder 
who needs psychological aid in order to survive and live a life that is “reasonably 
successful” (Sullivan 44), or in other words, socially cceptable and normal. 
 Literary critics outside of the realm of psychoanalysis also tend to forego 
exploring Bartleby as a nearly perfect example of inscrutability and instead produce 
definitive interpretations of the character.  Barbara Foley, in “From Wall Street to Astor 
Place: Historicizing Melville’s ‘Bartleby,’” explains the actions of Bartleby by analyzing 
the character within the contexts of both “contemporaneous discourse about class 
polarization” (91) as well as “contemporaneous struggles and discourses over property 
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rights” (96).  Foley claims that a relatively clear, coherent reading of this complicated 
character can be achieved by simply providing the details of these mid-nineteenth-
century political movements in order to historically situate him within it.  I chose Foley’s 
article in particular because it represents a common understanding of Bartleby.  Although 
Foley breaks some ground with her analysis of exactly how Bartleby positions himself 
within the discourses of land monopoly and wage labor (as well as her biographical 
argument about Melville and guilt in the latter half of the essay), she is not writing 
anything new when she describes Bartleby as the icon of the alienated proletariat.  In fact, 
she references Michael T. Gilmore, Louise K. Barnett, James C. Wilson, and David 
Kuebrich for their development of this popular interpr tation.  Of course this political 
analysis of Bartleby is crucial to the understanding of Melville’s story, but interpretations 
such as these disregard a key aspect of the story that I argue demands exploration: the 
frustratingly unexplainable character and actions of Bartleby that the story consistently 
exhibits.  And when this aspect is consistently neglected by scholars, the full character of 
Bartleby is lost.  
 For instance, Foley claims that by exploring the story’s few but crucial historical 
clues, such as the reference to the multi-millionaire real estate investor John Jacob Astor, 
“Bartleby’s conduct becomes less freakish and idiosyncratic, more plausible and 
historically significant” (96).  In a similar vein as Sullivan in his explanation that autism 
is blatantly apparent in the text to those who are f miliar with the condition, Foley argues 
that “any reader knowledgeable about the dual campaign against land monopoly and 
wage slavery in the strategy and discourse of contemporaneous radicalism would 
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recognize the appropriateness of Bartleby’s chosen mode of rebellion” (96).  Foley 
consents that Bartleby “hardly exudes proletarian cl ss consciousness or ‘leaps forth’ 
Whitman-style against his employer” (91).  Instead, she explains Bartleby’s rebellion as 
“withhold[ing] his labor power and assert[ing] his r ght to terrain” in order to affirm “a 
prior and unconditional doctrine of human rights” (96).  However, this interpretation of 
Bartleby, based on assumptions of why Bartleby acts in such a peculiar way, does not 
account for some of his strange remarks.  For example, when the narrator attempts to 
persuade Bartleby to look into other occupations, Bartleby responds in ways that are not 
congruent with language marked as resistant to the capitalist machine.  Bartleby refuses 
job options proposed by the narrator with the following explanatory remarks: “There is 
too much confinement about that. No, I would not like a clerkship; but I am not particular 
. . . It does not strike me that there is anything definite about [going as a companion to 
Europe]. I like to be stationary. But I am not particular” (58-59).  These comments are 
more in line with the psychoanalytical arguments that he is autistic or depressed than with 
Foley’s political analysis.  Another example is Bartleby’s response to the Tombs’ grub-
man in which he states, “I prefer not to dine today . . . It would disagree with me; I am 
unused to dinner” (63).  These examples of Bartleby’s izarre character in no way prove 
Foley’s argument wrong.  However, because these particul r eccentricities cannot fit into 
Foley’s outline of what Bartleby represents and thus cannot be made “less freakish . . . 
more plausible” by her historical explanation (Foley 96), they reveal that Bartleby is 
more than just a symbolic character of resistance against the injustices of mid-nineteenth-
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century wage labor and land monopoly in America, just as he is more than a victim of a 
DSM mental disorder.  He is a perfectly-crafted anomaly. 
 The persistent ambiguity of this story, habitually driven to the corner of Bartleby 
scholarship, composes one of the more prominent impressions provoked by this text and 
thus demands an analysis that embraces contradictions and unexplainable eccentricities.  
Melville keeps Bartleby’s motives not only hidden but also too complex and ridiculous to 
be rationally analyzed in a conclusive way, and through drawing such an unclassifiable 
character he highlights the irrational quality of and the contradictions existing within 
identity and reality.  Moreover, a close look at this unclassifiable character, with all of his 
unintelligible motives, reveals the story’s implication that human behavior in particular 
can be complicated, sometimes irrational, and unfit for society’s determined efforts to 
constantly explain and identify.  In a letter written to his friend Evert Duyckinck in 
February of 1851, just two years before the publication of “Bartleby,” Melville declines 
an offer to contribute a piece of writing to the Holden’s Dollar Magazine, and he chooses 
not to reveal his reasons for doing so, stating, “You must be content to believe that I have 
reasons, or else I would not refuse so small a thing” (180).  This quotation draws 
attention to the symbolic connection between Bartleby the scrivener, or writer, and 
Melville the author who “prefers not to” cater to certain publications and their particular 
stylistic demands and, in this particular instance, refuses any blatant explanation for his 
actions.  But the broad statement that follows Melvill ’s refusal is what really gives 
insight into his liberal understanding of fellow humans: “We are all queer customers, Mr. 
Duyckinck, you, I, and every body else in the world.  So if I here seem queer to you, be 
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sure, I am not alone in my queerness, tho’ it present itself at a different port, perhaps, 
from other people, since every one has his own distinct peculiarity” (180).  And what 
makes Melville’s story such a captivating tale is that Bartleby is an extremely peculiar 
and queer character, so odd that hundreds of scholars have argued over the best way to 
explain and define him, yet he is still a believable character.  Just after Melville published 
The Piazza Tales in 1856, one review in the Berkshire County Eagle called Bartleby “a 
portrait from life” (Fiene 151), and another published in Criterion discerned that 
“Bartleby must be based upon living characters” (Fiene 152).  Melville created a 
character that is both realistic and yet so eccentric that he pushes the limits of our 
understanding of what it is to be human.  What is fascinating about the effects of this 
story is that often readers push back in an effort to understand Bartleby within the social 
types that have already been deemed appropriate or normal.   
 The narrator’s frustration in his attempt to understand and define Bartleby, 
replicated and reinforced by the efforts of the “Bartleby Industry,” highlights this 
compulsion to categorize other humans into artificially-constructed identity types.  As 
with Bartleby, the narrator has been discussed in excess using varying schools of thought, 
and one of the most popular avenues for understanding him leads to an evaluation of his 
true motives in trying to help Bartleby or an exploration of why he is incapable of doing 
so.  Several scholars criticize the narrator for simply lacking what Steven Doloff explains 
as genuine “compassionate initiative” and “spontaneously active and unqualified 
expression of love for his ‘neighbor’” (359).  Others claim that the reason for the 
narrator’s inability to help Bartleby exists in a failure of communication between the 
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revolutionary scrivener and the authoritarian lawyer.  For example, John Durham Peters 
describes a common view of Bartleby as “a rebellious integrity” with whom “there can be 
no communication” because of his “heroic escape from the officious paper power of the 
lawyer’s world” (159).  And many scholars indict society, which they argue is 
represented by the narrator, for Bartleby’s demise.  David Kuebrich takes this particular 
stance and criticizes the narrator and thus society for the overall ignored and dismissed 
“discrepancy between the nation’s economic practices and its purported democratic and 
Christian ideals” (381) in which the former’s “dedicated pursuit of self-interest, even 
when it involves the exploitation of others” (396), conflicts with the latter’s devotion to 
the “commandment to love one’s neighbor” (394) and sacrifice individual desires for the 
whole.  Although Kuebrich concludes that the “central issue” of this story is “what it is 
that makes the lawyer unable to understand Bartleby and to respond with compassion” 
and that Melville “wanted his audience . . . to exprience [the narrator’s] sense of 
exasperation and puzzlement” (403-404), he still focuses his argument on the unsound 
assumption that Bartleby is looking for salvation, as I explained earlier in my analysis of 
his argument, and that the narrator is incapable of truly helping.  Instead, I fully examine 
this “sense of exasperation and puzzlement” by looking at the narrator’s obsession with 
comprehending Bartleby’s strange behavior outside of and beyond the contexts of 
charity, ability to communicate, or competence in helping others. 
 The final paragraph of this story, which the narrator describes as the “sequel,” 
reveals the importance of examining this story without looking at the narrator’s actions in 
relation to whether or not he wants to or is able to help Bartleby.  At this point, Bartleby 
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has died, and the narrator’s emotional investments in trying to help him have been in 
vain.  However, the narrator’s frustration and obsession with this character still lives, and 
thus the story cannot yet end.  The death of Bartleby brings about the death of the 
narrator’s desire to save him (whether genuine or not), but the desire to understand him 
adamantly remains.  The narrator can only rest his troubled mind when he has some 
insight into “who Bartleby was,” and he gets that from what he calls “one little item of 
rumor, which came to my ear a few months after the scrivener’s decease” (64).  This 
“vague report” as the narrator calls it is completely unverifiable, and the narrator hesitates 
to even mention it.  In fact, this concluding paragraph begins with such a subdued tone 
that the reader may at first assume it has no relevant or interesting material:  
 
There would seem little need for proceeding further in this history . . . But ere, 
parting with the reader, let me say, that if this little narrative has sufficiently 
interested him, to awaken curiosity as to who Bartleby was, and what manner of 
life he led prior to the present narrator’s making his acquaintance, I can only 
reply, that in such curiosity I fully share, but am wholly unable to gratify it. (64)   
 
The narrator, however, immediately proceeds to gratify this curiosity when he convinces 
himself to “briefly mention” the rumor to the reader since it had “not been without a 
certain suggestive interest” to him (65).   
 What follows this decision to “divulge” this “one little item of rumor” that the 
narrator admits is dubious at best, stating, “Upon what basis it rested I could never 
ascertain . . . how true it is I cannot now tell” (64), is a comprehensive explanation for 
Bartleby’s eccentricities.  The report, in its entirety, stated that “Bartleby had been a 
subordinate clerk in the Dead Letter Office at Washington, from which he had been 
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suddenly removed by a change in the administration” (65).  The narrator is then 
overwhelmed by the melancholy implications of this story:  
 
When I think over this rumor, hardly can I express the emotions which seize me.  
Dead letters!  does it not sound like dead men?  Conceive a man by nature and 
misfortune prone to a pallid hopelessness, can any business seem more fitted to 
heighten it than that of continually handling these dead letters, and assorting them 
for the flames? . . . On errands of life, these letters speed to death. (65) 
 
 
This emotional outburst is followed by the famous la t words of the narrator: “Ah, 
Bartleby!  Ah, humanity!” (65).  Now that the narrator feels that he understands 
Bartleby’s strange behavior, even though his explanatio  is based entirely on gossip and 
conjecture, he can finally rest his mind and pen.  Thus by looking at what actually 
resolves the narrator’s struggles with Bartleby, which the sequel reveals to be simply 
understanding and classifying him, the prominent reason for his frustration becomes 
clear.  In spite of his distraught exclamations about the “hopelessness of remedying 
excessive and organic ill” (42), the narrator is not preoccupied with Bartleby solely 
because of his powerlessness to help the scrivener; instead, he is obsessed with 
diagnosing and thus classifying Bartleby into a social type that he can comprehend.  
  Furthermore, the narrator’s final emotional exclamation is the climax of the 
narrator’s pity for Bartleby, for not until he belives that he completely understands why
Bartleby was acting so strangely can he fully relate to and thus sympathize with the 
scrivener.  And by explaining the why, the narrator is finally able to see Bartleby as an 
unfortunate member of the human family.  Throughout the story, the narrator describes 
Bartleby in non-human terms since he cannot place him within any socially-accepted 
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category such as criminal or madman.  He calls him an “intolerable incubus” (54) and a 
“helpless creature” (55), exclaiming, “what does conscience say I should do with this 
man, or, rather, ghost” (55).  He differentiates his own reasonable self as human from 
Bartleby’s irrational, inhuman self: “How could a human creature, with the common 
infirmities of our nature, refrain from bitterly exclaiming upon such perverseness― uch 
unreasonableness” (37).  Although the narrator has a lucid moment in which he 
sympathizes with Bartleby as a fellow human, stating, “A fraternal melancholy! For both 
I and Bartleby were sons of Adam” (40), this scene o ly serves as a temporary reminder 
to the narrator that in fact Bartleby is a human, in spite of his differences.  Not long after 
this exclamation, the narrator returns to describing Bartleby in inhuman terms such as 
“fixture in my chamber” (46) and “apparition in my room” (54).  But when the narrator 
hears the rumor of the Dead Letters Office job and makes assumptions about its effects 
on Bartleby in order to explain the scrivener’s actions, he can relate to Bartleby as an 
actual human being and have true pity on this famili r model of the lonely, despondent 
man. 
Melville’s most prominent biographer Hershel Parker interprets this sequel 
through an analysis of power play, revealing that te narrator’s final lines do not 
represent brotherly love but instead reveal the narrator’s transformed understanding of 
Bartleby: 
 
What is important about the rumor is not what it tells about Bartleby, since it may 
be false, but what it tells about the narrator . . . When he sighs, ‘Ah, Bartleby! Ah 
humanity!’ he is not consciously evoking the sense of ‘common humanity’ which 
once plunged him very near a tragic sense of life. Instead, the concluding words 
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reduce his experience with the strange scrivener to manageable, not-unpleasing 
terms: they show he is at last in control. (162, 164) 
 
 
Although Parker argues that the narrator’s “comfortable, self-indulgent variety of 
melancholy” and superior feeling towards Bartleby is what prevents him from truly 
relating to the “inferior” scrivener (163), his analysis is key to understanding why the 
narrator and society in general become so frustrated with people that do not fit into 
normalized identity categories.  When people cannot be simplified and classified, they 
cannot be controlled, and Bartleby resists all authority and regulation by not succumbing 
to social norms.   
 The rumor, then, allows the narrator to place Bartleby into the same classification 
system that he easily places Turkey, Nippers, and Gi ger-Nut, and that system is a 
manageable world free of ambiguities and contradictions.  Just as the narrator explains 
the oddities of these three simpler characters at the beginning of the story, in the end he 
can finally rationalize the eccentric behavior of Bartleby, and the fact that this 
rationalization is drawn from assumptions based on an unverifiable rumor reveals his 
desperation to understand and identify the inscrutable scrivener.  The story, then, 
highlights the problem with the narrator’s and subsequently society’s inability to accept 
the inexplicably weird characters that don’t fit known identity types, the “ridiculous and 
irrational” quality of life, that Melville wrote about in his letters.  Because the sequel is 
only based on conjecture and fails to give a sound conclusion, the insightful reader is left 
unsatisfied.  Although the narrator has fooled himself into accepting the rumor as truth in 
order to resolve his internal struggle with this oddity of a man and conclude his story, the 
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keen reader remains wrapped up in the puzzling and mysterious aura that Bartleby 
evokes.  This seems to be one of Melville’s purposes in writing such a complicated 
character.  He reveals that human beings are too complex to be easily explained and 
classified into simplistic identity roles, and the proof is in the narrator’s distraught 
attempts to understand Bartleby and in the scholars’ obsession with interpreting him. 
Within this revelation, then, Melville specifically critiques the limiting identity 
role of the mid-nineteenth-century American man.  Bartleby resists the core elements that 
comprise the ideal male during this time, and thus t e story prompts the reader to 
question the social standards of manhood.  The narrator simply cannot imagine a man 
who “would prefer not to” live the typical, monotonus life of an American scrivener on 
Wall Street, and his stab at a resolution in the sequel is a weak attempt to resituate 
Bartleby within the realm of what he considers appro riate manhood.  Thomas Augst in 
The Clerk’s Tale: Young Men and Moral Life in Nineteenth-Century America explores 
the ways in which male office clerks understood social status and identity in antebellum 
America: 
 
The moral identity of manhood was something to be acquired within the 
marketplace . . . Writing by the prosaic rules of daily life, young men applied 
economic metaphors to the management of character . . . [assuming] that one can 
readily calculate the value of experience at regular intervals in the way that one 
measures the profit and loss of an enterprise (5, 50). 
 
Augst’s research reveals Melville’s criticism of this limiting way to define men.  Bartleby 
does not submit to this capitalistic model of self-identification.  He is not failing at 
success; he simply “prefers not to” participate in the system.  By writing Bartleby as 
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someone who chooses not to engage in the “profit/loss” scheme of character evaluation, 
Melville exposes the flaws of this type of identification and reveals the need for a more 
liberal understanding of manhood within the emerging market culture.  The ideal working 
man of the nineteenth century is expected to earnestly strive to increase his wealth and 
financial status, and his ability to do so determines his worth as a man.  Bartleby can’t be 
appropriately understood within this capitalist system of identification, though the 
narrator desperately tries, just as he can’t be simplistically classified as a victim of a DSM 
disorder or even interpreted as only a symbol of the estranged wage-laborer. 
 In a similar vein as Augst’s work, Scott Sandage’s Born Losers explains how this 
capitalistic configuration of character evaluation transformed the definition of freedom in 
early and mid-nineteenth-century America, and Sandage’s work is helpful to discerning 
Melville’s frustration with the effects of this socially-accepted identity role for men.  He 
states that during this “era of self-made men and manifest destiny” (3) in which “the only 
identity deemed legitimate in America is a capitalist identity” (5), “nineteenth-century 
Americans swapped liberty for ambition, adopting the striver’s ethic as the best of all 
possible freedoms” (14).  Melville’s Bartleby with his lived-out preferences embodies 
true individual freedom, in opposition to the emerging definition of personal liberty as 
“freedom to profit or to succeed,” and Sandage explains this in his short discussion of 
“Bartleby”: “Pushing the scrivener’s rebellion unto absurdity, Melville showed that the 
theoretical free agent was not meant to make real choices” (64).  Although the “free 
market” offered hope of success and the possibility for financial and personal growth, 
encompassed in the popular phrase “the American dream,” Melville’s short story shows 
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how the acceptance of this new conceptualization of manhood and individual freedom, 
grounded in monetary and capitalist rhetoric, prohibits men from actually expressing, in 
Melville’s words, their “queerness,” their “own distinct peculiarity.” 
 Furthermore, the market culture of mid-nineteenth-century America fostered a 
more rigid social system that restrained interaction and communication between men, as 
seen in the relationship between Bartleby and the narrator.  Michael T. Gilmore explains 
this stifling of social relations in American Romanticism and the Marketplace:  
 
The rationalization and growth of capitalist enterprise in the middle decades of the 
century turned many of these once independent workmen into wage-earning 
proletarians and established cash payment as the sole nexus between employer 
and employee.  Obligations, generally between strangers, were now purely 
contractual, and traditional habits of sociability yielded to a new emphasis on 
regularity and discipline. (134)  
 
This “emphasis on regularity and discipline” limits self-expression and prohibits real 
communication between men in the business setting, hence the inability for the narrator 
to understand the scrivener who prefers not to abide y these social tenets.  Bartleby 
continues to live out his “queerness,” even though the market culture in which he lives 
does not support it.  Although I am aligning my argument here with the many critics, 
including Barbara Foley, who interpret Bartleby as representing Melville’s criticism of 
the market culture’s effects on society, I am in no way trying to explain away Bartleby’s 
strange behavior by claiming that he is only a symbol of these effects, a victim of society, 
a simple representation of the problems with capitalism.  Bartleby’s inscrutability 
remains in-tact, even through and within my interprtation of Melville’s anxieties of the 
expanding market.  Historicizing Melville’s frustraion with society’s restrictive 
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stipulations on identity and individual freedom does not clarify and thus eradicate 
Bartleby’s eccentric behavior.  Instead, it demonstrates the particular historical 
atmosphere that supported such narrow-mindedness exmplified by the narrator’s 
obsession with simplifying Bartleby in order to understand him.  
 Another aspect of Melville’s cultural environment that fostered a limiting 
understanding of identity and personal liberty concer s America’s pervasive efforts to 
cultivate nationalism in the first half of the ninete nth century.  America was anxious, 
even desperate, to establish itself as its own united cultural entity in spite of its youth as a 
nation and its hodgepodge ethnic composition, and natio alists considered the cultivation 
of a particularly American style of literature a priority in this process.  The introduction 
to the first issue of The United States Magazine and Democratic Review, a popular, mid-
nineteenth-century journal promulgated by a small group of New York-based literary 
nationalists called Young Americans, exemplifies thi idea of the literary arts playing a 
key role in the establishment of America as a natio: “It is only by its literature that one 
nation can utter itself and make itself known to the rest of the world” (quoted in Wald 
113).  Duyckinck, who kept a close correspondence with Melville for years, acted as 
literary editor for this journal from 1844 to 1846, and his essay “Nationality in 
Literature” expresses a similar sentiment about the importance of literature in a 
burgeoning nation: “We would set no limits to the subjects on which our authors should 
write.  We would leave them the whole range of nature and humanity.  We would wish 
them to strike every key in the grand scale of human p ssion.  But we would have them 
true to their country” (77).  As Priscilla Wald explains in Constituting Americans, “the 
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authors free to write as they please must nonetheless continually (re)constitute ‘America’ 
and ‘Americans’” (121), and critics of this type of nationalism and of Young America in 
general “contend[ed] that the movement would circumscribe the very independence and 
originality for which it called” due to its “prescriptiveness” (120).  Albert Weinberg in 
his book Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History 
explains that this tension between individualism and national unity comprises the essence 
of the American government: “This ideal, conceived as ‘the last best revelation of human 
thought’ was democracy―a theory of mass sovereignty but in a more important aspect a 
complex of individualistic values which . . . Americans most frequently summarized by 
the inspiring word ‘freedom’” (100).  Melville struggled personally with this tension in 
his writing career, for he wanted to write in his own style while simultaneously making 
money and living up to the Young Americans’ and other nationalists’ hope that he would 
be, as Perry Miller states in The Raven and The Whale, the “Master Genius of American 
Literature” that the young nation so desperately desired (116). 
 However, Melville’s relationship to this nationalistic movement changed 
drastically throughout his lifetime.  During the early years of his literary career he 
“enjoyed an intimate relationship with Young America” but by the publication of Pierre: 
or, The Ambiguities in 1852 had almost completely parted ways with the movement 
(Wald 122).  In fact, Miller claims that the group at one point “accused [Melville] of 
betraying his country” by not producing an appropriately American work (273).  In an 
oft-quoted letter to Hawthorne from June, 1851, Melvill  reveals his anxiety over 
whether to write what his nation desires of him (and thus what will pay) or to write the 
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truth: “Dollars damn me . . . What I feel most moved to write, that is banned, ― it will 
not pay.  Yet, altogether, write the other way I cannot” (191).  Bartleby with his socially-
unacceptable eccentricities and his resistance to social norms signifies this dilemma that 
frustrated and eventually destroyed Melville’s chances at living out his life as a 
financially successful author.  Furthermore, Bartleby’s fatal conclusion relates to the 
demise of Melville’s career.  Bartleby is free to live out his individualistic ways, just as 
Melville is free to write whatever he pleases, but the repercussions for these actions are 
harsh.  In an analysis of Moby-Dick’s Ahab, Wai Chee Dimock explains Melville’s 
awareness and struggle with the flip-side of self-rliance: self-victimization, stating that 
the two “are kindred, the freedom of the one making up the fate of the other, the penalty 
for one being the other’s reward” (208).  Had Bartleby sacrificed his selfhood or 
character and succumb to the normalized identity role of an American man, his story may 
not have been a tragedy.  And if Melville had submitted to the desires of the nation and to 
the demands of the market, he probably would not have ended up telling Hawthorne later 
in life that he had “pretty much made up his mind to be annihilated” (quoted in Miller, 
337).  
This story’s resistance to a simplification of character is a marvelous 
representation of Melville’s stubborn efforts to write what he considered true and real, no 
matter how strange or unconventional.  The narrator of Melville’s unfinished novella 
Billy Budd claims that “Truth uncompromisingly told will always have its ragged edges” 
(109).  Despite the narrator’s attempt to explain Bartleby’s eccentricities with the Dead 
Letters rumor and scholars’ endeavors to clarify the scrivener’s ambiguities, Bartleby 
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persists as his true self, with all the “ragged edges,” defying nineteenth-century ideals of 
manhood and individual freedom that still persist in our society today.  In June of 1851, 
just two years before the publication of “Bartleby,” Melville wrote to Hawthorne 
explaining society’s refusal to accept reality, or what he calls “truth,” with all of its 
strange and incomprehensible qualities: “Truth is the silliest thing under the sun.  Try to 
get a living by the Truth―and go to the Soup Societies.  Heavens!  Let any clergyman try 
to preach the Truth from its very stronghold, the pulpit, and they would ride him out of 
his church on his own pulpit banister” (191).  He con ludes his rant with the statement 
“Truth is ridiculous to men” (191), and because society sees the true Bartleby as 
“ridiculous” and unacceptable, scholars constantly change him, manipulate him, control 
him so that he fits into our understanding of the world around us.  Yet, in the text of 
Melville’s magnificently strange story, Bartleby still lives, weird and inscrutable, 
continuing to frustrate and baffle readers and scholars alike. 
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